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Abstract
With the rapid proliferation of client-to-client applica-
tions, PAKE (password authenticated key exchange) proto-
cols in the client-to-client setting become increasingly im-
portant. In this paper, we propose an efficient client-to-
client PAKE protocol, which has much better performance
than existing generic constructions. We also show that the
proposed protocol is secure under a formal security model.
1. Introduction
Since the advent of computers, human memorable pass-
word has historically been used as the main means for user
authentication, due to its low cost and ease to use nature. In
particular, a user only needs to memorize a short password
and can be authenticated anywhere, anytime; no special-
ized hardware device is required for generating and storing
password, which is of particular importance as users are be-
coming increasingly roaming nowadays. Although alterna-
tive strong authentication approaches, e.g., digital signature
and biometrics [11], exist, password authentication is still
gaining popularity and is believed to continue to play an
important part in the future.
The dominate scenario for password authentication is in
the client-server setting where each client user registers in
advance her password to a server who offers a certain ser-
vice; subsequently, each time a user wants to access the
server’s service, the two interact and negotiate a shared se-
cret session key between them, based solely on the pass-
word; the secret session key will be used in the ensuing
phase of data transmission. This process is usually referred
to as password authenticated key exchange (PAKE). In this
work, we focus on a different, client-to-client, scenario,
where two client users holding distinct passwords interact
and negotiate a secret session key between them. To avoid
the situation that a user has to share a different password
with each of the other users she wants to communicate, a
server will be employed so that every client user registers to
the server as in the client-server scenario, and any two users
wishing to communicate establish a shared session key be-
tween them with the help of the server. The client-to-client
scenario is also referred to as PAKE in the three-party set-
ting in the literature [1, 2, 16].
The client-to-client PAKE paradigm turns out to be quite
useful, especially when client-to-client applications such as
online chat and SMS (Short Message Service) are increas-
ingly prevalent nowadays. However, to enjoy the advan-
tages of password authentication in the client-to-client set-
ting, we first need to address the weaknesses inherent in
password based systems. It is well known that human user
chosen passwords are weak in the sense that they are nor-
mally drawn from a small dictionary space. This allows for
brute-force dictionary attacks where an attacker enumerates
every possible password in the dictionary to determine the
actual password.
Dictionary attacks can be mounted either on-line or off-
line. In an on-line dictionary attack, the attacker repeatedly
attempts to login to the server by trying a distinct password
for every login request. In contrast, in an off-line dictio-
nary attack, an attacker garners the transcript of a past lo-
gin session, and then checks all the passwords in the dictio-
nary against the login transcript. While off-line dictionary
attacks were proven notoriously hard to handle (see e.g.,
[3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12]), countermeasures to on-line dictionary
attacks were believed to be relatively easy by limiting the
number of unsuccessful login attempts made by a user. A
recent result in [16] however revealed that on-line dictio-
nary attacks in the client-to-client PAKE systems are more
complicated than originally thought, and they can be either
detectable or undetectable.
1.1. Related Work
Resistance to off-line dictionary attacks has long been in
the core of research on password authentication. The sem-
inal work on PAKE is due to Bellovin and Merritt [5], who
proposed encrypted key exchange protocols where each
data flow is encrypted using the shared password between
a user and the server. However, no formal security model
and analysis were given in [5]. Since then, numerous stud-
ies focused on formal model and security of PAKE, and as
a result, a number of provable secure PAKE protocols have
been proposed, e.g., [3, 6, 7, 12, 14].
However, the majority of the existing effort, such as
[3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14] considered PAKE in the client-server
setting. Only a few efforts are known to study client-to-
client PAKE, e.g., [4, 13, 15]. These earlier works however
do not contain formal security model and security analysis
for their schemes. The first security model for client-to-
client PAKE was given by Abdalla et. al [1], along with
a generic construction of provable secure protocols. Soon
after that, Abdalla et. al [2] proposed an efficient specific
client-to-client PAKE protocol, which involves only two
rounds of message exchanges between a client user and the
server. Unfortunately, the specific protocol in [2] was later
found by Choo et. al [9] falling prey to inside attacks. That
is, a malicious client user (i. e., a user who shares a pass-
word with the server) can play man-in-the-middle between
each of the two communicating users and the server in such
a way that the malicious user eventually computes the secret
key shared between the two communicating users.
Choo et. al’s attacks are essentially identity-misbinding
attacks. A remedy to such attacks is to include the identities
of both communicating parties in the message authentica-
tion codes carried in the last data flows from the server to
users. Wang et. al [16] found another attack against Ab-
dalla et. al’s specific protocol: they revealed that on-line
dictionary attacks can be detectable and undetectable, and
the protocol in [2] is vulnerable to undetectable on-line dic-
tionary attacks, where the server is not even aware of the oc-
currence of on-line dictionary attacks by a malicious client
user. This makes regular countermeasures against on-line
dictionary attacks, such as limiting the number of consecu-
tive login failures, totally ineffective. To show how to con-
struct secure client-to-client PAKE protocols against unde-
tectable on-line dictionary attacks, Wang et. al further pro-
posed a generic construction built on top of client-server
PAKE protocols.
1.2. Our Contribution
One countermeasure to undetectable on-line dictionary
attacks is forcing a password to expire after a threshold
number of logins, failed or successful. However, this so-
lution is inconvenient since it requires users to frequently
change their passwords. In this paper we present a specific
client-to-client PAKE protocol secure against undetectable
on-line dictionary attacks. This is achieved in our protocol
by making every on-line dictionary attack detectable. Com-
pared to the generic constructions of Wang et. al in [16] and
Abdalla et. al in [1], our specific protocol is much more ef-
ficient in both communication and computation overheads.
This improvement in performance is essential in client-to-
client applications, since users often communicate using
resource-constraint devices such as mobile phones. We also
show that the proposed protocol is secure under a formal
security model.
1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we present the formal model for client-to-client
PAKE systems. In Section 3, we give a detailed description
of our protocol, along with security analysis and compari-
son of its performance with other provably-secure schemes.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Formal Definition
The formal security model for client-to-client PAKE was
first proposed by Abdalla et. al [1], based on the models
from [7, 8]. Abdalla et. al’s model however does not con-
sider undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. Wang et. al
[16] thus extended Abdalla et. al’s model by introducing a
new oracle to model undetectable on-line dictionary attacks
against the server. Since our scheme achieves the same level
of security as the earlier works, it suffices for us to adapt the
model of [2, 16] to our use.
2.1. Communication Model
Protocol Participants. The participants in a client-to-client
PAKE system include three disjoint sets: the set of honest-
but-curious servers S; the set of honest client users C, and
the set of malicious client users E . We also denote U =
C ∪ E the set of all client users. For simplicity of proof and
without loss of generality, S is often assumed to contain
a single server [1, 2]. E corresponds to insider users who
can maliciously play man-in-the-middle as in Choo et. al’s
attacks or mount undetectable on-line dictionary attacks as
in Want et. al’s attacks.
Long-lived Keys. Each client user U ∈ U holds a password
pwU . The server S ∈ S holds vector pwS = 〈pwS [U ]〉U∈U
with an entry for each client user U . pwS [U ] corresponding
to user U may or may not be the same as pwU . In the latter
case, pwS [U ] is a transformed value of pwU by some one-
way function.
Protocol Execution. An adversary A is assumed to be at
the center of the communication, such that all interactions
between protocol participants are conducted through A; no
direct communication exists between protocol participants.
Interactions betweenA and any protocol participant are ab-
stracted by oracle queries, which model the adversary’s ca-
pabilities in a real attack. During the protocol execution, A
can create several instances of a participant. A is free to
modify, generate, replay, and redirect messages to any par-
ticipant instance. Let U i (Sj , respectively) be the i-th (j-
th, respectively) instance of client user U (S, respectively).
The allowed queries are the following.
• Execute(U i11 , Sj , U i22 ): This query models passive at-
tacks where the adversary eavesdrops on the honest
executions among client instances U i11 , U
i2
2 and the
server instance Sj . The output of this query consists
of the messages exchanged during the honest execu-
tion of the protocol.
• SendClient(U i,m): This query models an active at-
tack against client users, where the adversary sends a
message m to the client instance U i. The output of this
query is the message U i would generate upon receipt
of m, according to the protocol specification.
• SendServer(Sj ,m): This query models an active at-
tack against the server, where the adversary sends a
message m to the server instance Sj . The output of
this query is the message Sj would generate upon re-
ceipt of m, according to the protocol specification.
• Reveal(U i): This query models the misuse of session
keys by the client users. It returns to the adversary the
session key of client instance U i, as long as the key is
defined.
• Test(U i): This query does not model any attack. It
is actually used to measure the semantic security of
the session keys produced by the protocol execution.
More specifically, initially before any call is made, a
random hidden bit b is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}.
The query returns ⊥ if the session key of U i is not de-
fined. Otherwise, it returns to the adversary the session
key held by U i if b = 0, or a random key of the same
size if b = 1.
2.2. Security Definition
Let us first recall some notations in [1, 7, 8]. An instance
U i is said to be opened if a query Reveal(U i) has been
asked by the adversary; otherwise, U i is unopened. We say
an instance U i accepts if it goes into an accept mode after
receiving the last expected protocol message. A session is
said to be active if it involves SendClient or SendServer
queries by the adversary.
Partnering. The definition of partnering depends on the
notion of session identity (sid) [7], which includes the es-
sential transcript of the interactions between the client users
and the server before they accept. In particular, two in-
stances U i1 and U
j
2 are said to be partners if all the following
conditions are met: (1) both U i1 and U j2 accept; (2) both U i1
and U j2 share the same sid; (3) the partner for U i1 is U j2 , and
vice versa; (4) no other instances than U i1 and U j2 accept
with a partner as U i1 or U
j
2 .
Freshness. An instance U i is fresh if it accepts, both U i
and its partner are unopened, and they are both instances of
honest client users.
AKE Semantic Security. We are ready to define security
regarding AKE (Authenticated Key Exchange). The secu-
rity notion is defined over an experiment in execution of the
client-to-client PAKE protocol P by the adversary A who
has access to the Execute, SendClient, SendServer,
Reveal, and Test oracles; A can ask at most one Test
query to a fresh instance of an honest client user, after which
A is not allowed to ask Reveal queries any more; finally,A
outputs a bit b′, in an attempt to guess the hidden bit used in
the Test query. A is said to win the experiment defining the
semantic security if b′ = b. We denote Succ the event that
A wins the experiment. The advantage ofA in violating the
semantic security of the protocol P , when user passwords
are drawn from a dictionary D, is defined as follows:
AdvakeP,D(A) = 2Pr[Succ]− 1
And the advantage function of the protocol P on AKE se-
mantic security is defined
AdvakeP,D(t, R) = maxA
{AdvakeP,D(A)}
where the maximum is taken over all A with time-
complexity at most t and using resources at most R such
as the number of oracle queries.
A client-to-client PAKE protocol is semantically secure
if the advantage function AdvakeP,D(t, R) ≤ kn/|D| + ²(κ),
where n is the number of active sessions, k is a constant,
and ²(κ) is a negligible function of the security parameter
κ. Note that the best one can expect is k = 1, which cor-
responds to the case that the adversary tries a distinct pass-
word in each of the n active sessions and ends up having an
advantage of n/|D| in total.
Authentication. The authentication property, especially
the client-to-server authentication is essential in thwart-
ing undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. We thus must
provide client-to-server authentication in a client-to-client
PAKE protocol. The definition of client-to-server authenti-
cation is based on the fact that either both client users ac-
cept or neither accepts. The adversary A is given oracle
access to Execute, SendClient, SendServer, Reveal.
We denote SuccAu the event that a user instance ac-
cepts but does not have a partner. The advantage of A
in violating client-to-server authentication of the proto-
col P is defined as Advc2s−auP,D (A) = 2Pr[SuccAu] −
1. The advantage function of the protocol P on client-
to-server authentication is defined Advc2s−auP,D (t, R) =
maxA{Advc2s−auP,D (A)}, where the maximum is taken over
all A with time-complexity at most t and using resources at
mostR. A client-to-client PAKE protocol is client-to-server
authenticated if the advantage function Advc2s−auP,D (t, R) ≤
kn/|D|+ ²(κ).
Key Privacy to Server. In a client-to-client PAKE pro-
tocol, the secret session key established between the two
client users should be kept hidden from the server. Con-
sidering the fact the server is honest-but-curious, we give
a simulation-based model for key privacy, which has eas-
ier proof compared to the model by Abdalla et. al in [1].
The drawback of our model however is that it is not consis-
tent with the earlier communication model. Our model con-
siders that protocol participants interact directly in a natu-
ral way according to the protocol specification, because the
server itself is the adversary A here. We define the view
view of the adversary over a PAKE session as all messages
received and sent out by the adversary, as well as its inter-
nal state (including pwS), together with the output of the
protocol. We say a client-to-client PAKE protocol achieves
key privacy to server if for any session between any two
client users, which yields a session key sk, for all PPT algo-
rithm A, there exists a PPT simulator A∗, such that for any
function f, it holds |Pr[A(view) = f(sk)]− Pr[A∗(1κ) =
f(sk)]| ≤ ²(κ), where κ is the security parameter, e.g., it
determines the length of the session keys. This definition
states that seeing the protocol transcript does not help the
adversary to derive the session key established between two
client users, since the simulator, seeing nothing, can derive
whatever the adversary derives on the session key.
3. Our Scheme
3.1. Scheme Details
Overview. The reason why the scheme in [2] suffers from
undetectable on-line dictionary attacks is that the server
does not check the validity of the client users before send-
ing out the messages that help the two users establish the
session key. Therefore, the basic idea of our construction is
to let the server verify the genuineness of client users in the
first place.
Public Parameters. Let q be a sufficiently large prime,
Gq a finite cyclic group G of order q and g a generator of
Gq. Let H(.),H1(.),H2(.), and H3(.) be cryptographic
hash functions. In practice, all Hi(.) can be implemented
using a single hash function H(.) as Hi(.) = H(i, .)
Protocol. Suppose in the registration phase, each client
user Ui has already registered her password pwUi to the
server S. A complete description of the protocol among
two client users A, B, and the server S is shown in Fig-
ure 1. Since the procedure for the two client users is the
same, let us mainly focus on the interactions between A and
S for exposition.
To start, A sends the identities of the two communicating
users to S. To verify the genuineness of A, S selects uni-
formly a random number rA ∈R Zq, and computes RA =
grA ∈ Gq and XA = RA.H1(A,B, pwA) ∈ Gq. S then
returns XA to A. Upon receipt of the message, A selects a
random number x ∈R Zq, and computes a temporary key
for authentication as tpkA = (XA/H1(A,B, pwA))x =
grA.x ∈ Gq. A also computes YA = gx ∈ Gq and an
authenticator on A,B as auA = H2(tpkA, A,B). A then
passes YA and auA to S. To check the validity of A, S first
computes tpk′A = Y
rA
A = g
x.rA ∈ Gq, and then checks
H2(tpk′A, A,B)
?= auA: if the equation holds, then S is as-
sured that he is indeed talking with A; otherwise, S aborts.
Only after S confirms validity of both client users, will he
proceed to send out M3 and M ′3 to enable A and B to es-
tablish the session key. In particular, for A, S calculates
an authenticator on YB as auA = H3(tpk′A, A,B, YB), and
sends YB , auA to A. After verification of auA, A computes
the secret session key as skA = H(A,B, YA, YB , Y xB ) =
H(A,B, YA, YB , gx.y). It is also easy to check that the ses-
sion key computed by B is skB = H(A,B, YA, YB , Y xB ) =
H(A,B, YA, YB , gy.x). Hence correctness of the protocol
is achieved.
3.2. Security Analysis
The interactions between each client user and the server
are essentially the PAK protocol [14], but we novelly “re-
verse” the order of authentication such that the server ver-
ifies the user first. Virtually all existing PAKE protocols
enable the user to verify the server first. This reverse order
of authentication is important to eliminate undetectable on-
line dictionary attacks in our setting. A byproduct of this
arrangement is that it also enables us to combine the “key
exchange” step with the “user verifies the server” step. This
is the main reason why our specific scheme has better per-
formance than Wang et. al’s generic construction. The se-
curity of our protocol is basically based on that of the PAK
protocol.
Prior to formal security analysis, let us first recall com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Let q,Gq, g
be defined as earlier. The CDH assumption states that it is
computationally infeasible to compute gx.y , given gx and
gy where x, y ∈R Zq. More formally, let A be a PPT al-
A (pwA) S (pwA, pwB) B (pwB)
M0: A,B−−−−−−−−−→
rA, rB ∈R Zq
RA = g
rA , XA = RA.H1(A,B, pwA)
RB = g
rB , XB = RB .H1(B,A, pwB)
M1:XA←−−−−−−−− M
′
1:XB , A−−−−−−−−→
x ∈R Zq y ∈R Zq
tpkA = (XA/H1(A,B, pwA))
x tpkB = (XB/H1(B,A, pwB))
y
YA = g
x, auA = H2(tpkA, A,B) YB = g
y, auB = H2(tpkB , B,A)
M2: YA, auA−−−−−−−−−→ M
′
2: YB , auB←−−−−−−−−−
tpk′A = Y
rA
A , H2(tpk
′
A, A,B)
?
= auA
tpk′B = Y
rB
B , H2(tpk
′
B , B,A)
?
= auB
auA = H3(tpk
′
A, A,B, YB)
auB = H3(tpk
′
B , B,A, YA)
M3: YB , auA←−−−−−−−− M3
′: YA, auB−−−−−−−−−→
H3(tpk,A,B, YB)
?
= auA H3(tpkB , B,A, YA)
?
= auB
skA = H(A,B, YA, YB , Y
x
B ) skB = H(A,B, YA, YB , Y
y
A)
Figure 1. A client-to-client PAKE Protocol.
gorithm, given as input gx and gy , then the advantage of
A is AdvCDHGq (A) = Pr[gx.y ∈ A(gx, gy) | x, y ∈R Gq].
Let AdvCDHGq (t, n) = maxA(A), where the maximum is
taken over all A of time complexity at most t and outputs
at most n elements of Gq. The CDH assumption says that
AdvCDHGq (t, n) is negligible.
AKE Semantic Security. For AKE semantic security, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let P be the protocol described in Figure 1
using group Gq, and user passwords are drawn from a dic-
tionary D. Fix an adversary A that runs in time at most
t, and makes qclnt, qserv , qexe, and qrevl queries of Send-
Client, SendServer, Execute, and Reveal, respectively, and
qro queries of random oracles that simulate the hash func-
tions used in the protocol. Then for t′ = O(t + (4.q2ro +
qclnt + qserv + qexe)texp), where texp is the time for expo-
nentiation computation in Gq:
AdvakeP,D(A) = qclnt+qserv|D| +
O((qclnt + qserv).AdvCDHGq (t
′, q2ro) +
(qclnt+qserv+qexe)(qro+qclnt+qserv+qexe)
q )
The proof of Theorem 1 involves a series of hybrid ex-
periments, starting with the real attacks and ending in an
experiment where the adversary has no advantage. For lack
of space, we omit the proof here.
Authentication. The following theorem states the security
on authentication property of our protocol.
Theorem 2. Let P be the protocol described in Figure 1
using group Gq, and user passwords are drawn from a dic-
tionary D. Fix an adversary A that runs in time at most
t, and makes qclnt, qserv , qexe, and qrevl queries of Send-
Client, SendServer, Execute, and Reveal, respectively, and
qro queries of random oracles that simulate the hash func-
tions. Then for t′ = O(t+(qro+qclnt+qserv+qexe)texp),
where texp is the time for exponentiation computation in
Gq:
Advc2s−auP,D (A) = qclnt+qserv|D| +
O((qclnt + qserv).AdvCDHGq (t
′, q2ro) +
(qclnt+qserv+qexe)(qro+qclnt+qserv+qexe)
q )
The proof of Theorem 2 again includes a series of hybrid
experiments, and it is quite similar to the proof for the PAK
protocol. Interested readers can refer to [14] for reference.
Key Privacy to Server We have the following theorem to
state key privacy to server.
Theorem 3. Let P be the protocol described in Figure 1.
Then P achieves key privacy to server defined above, if CDH
assumption holds and hash functions are pseudo-random
functions.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it suffices for us to construct
a PPT simulator A∗ such that for all adversary A in any
session, A∗(1κ) can generate a view∗ that is computation-
ally indistinguishable from view of A. Take the (partial)
view view1 ofA with the first user (i.e., client A) for exam-
ple, view1 = [rA, XA, YA, auA, YB , auA, skA]. A∗ con-
structs view∗1 = [r
∗
A ∈R Zq, X∗A = r∗A.rand1, Y ∗A =
gx
∗
(x∗ ∈R Zq), au∗A = H2(gr
∗
A.x
∗
, A,B), Y ∗B =
gy
∗
(y∗ ∈R Zq), au∗A = H2(gr
∗
A.x
∗
, A,B, Y ∗B), sk
∗
A =
H(A,B, Y ∗A, Y
∗
B , g
x∗.y∗)], where rand1 is a random num-
ber of appropriate length. It is easy to check that view1
and view∗1 are computationally indistinguishable under the
CDH assumption and that the hash functions are pseudo-
random functions.
3.3. Performance Comparison
We compare the performance of our scheme with those
of Wang et. al’s protocol [16] and Abdalla et. al’s protocol
[1]. We list the results in Table 1. The statistics are over-
heads upon each client user. For ease of comparison, we
assume that both Wang et. al’s scheme and Abdalla et. al’s
scheme use the PAK protocol to instantiate PAKE between
the client users and the server. The PAK protocol represents
state-of-the-art of PAKE in the user-server setting.
Table 1. Comparison Results
Round Communication Computation
Our scheme 4 |PAK| + |Gq| PAK + Exp
Wang et. al’s
scheme [16]
5 |PAK| + 2.|Gq| PAK + 2.Exp
Abdalla et. al’s
scheme [1]
7 |PAK| + 2.|Gq| PAK + 2.Exp
Our scheme has 4 rounds of message exchanges, among
which 3 are essential, since M0 simply signals the server
to start. The other two schemes have 5 and 7 rounds, re-
spectively. For communication, we only count the number
of elements in Gq exchanged in respective protocols. As
a result, communication overhead in our scheme includes
the messages from the PAK protocol between a user and the
server plus an element in Gq (i.e., YB in M3). In contrast,
each of the other two schemes has 1 more element in Gq.
For computation, we only count exponentiation operations.
So, each of the other two schemes has 1 more exponenti-
ation than our scheme. Note that for communication and
computation overheads, if we take other messages and op-
erations into account, our scheme is even more efficient than
the other two.
4. Conclusions
The two known constructions of client-to-client PAKE
protocols are generic, and they thus do not have satisfac-
tory performance, although secure. In this paper, we pro-
posed a specific scheme based on the PAK protocol, which
has much better performance than the two generic construc-
tions. As a result, our protocol is more suitable for practical
client-to-client applications that often involves users using
resource-constraint communication devices.
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